Long Run Trends and Fluctuations In Cotton Prices by MacDonald, Stephen & Meyer, Leslie
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Long Run Trends and Fluctuations In
Cotton Prices
Stephen MacDonald and Leslie Meyer
World Agricultural Outlook Board, USDA, Economic Research
Service, USDA
22 January 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84484/
MPRA Paper No. 84484, posted 13 February 2018 15:15 UTC
1 
 
LONG RUN TRENDS AND FLUCTUATIONS IN COTTON PRICES 
Stephen MacDonald 
WAOB/USDA 
Washington, DC 
Leslie Meyer 
ERS/USDA 
Washington, DC 
 
Abstract 
 
One revelation from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis was the fragility of models and assumptions based on samples 
too short to include periods of high volatility, and this study attempts to remedy that short-coming for USDA’s 
development of long run cotton price projections. Real cotton prices have fallen significantly since 1900, but 
statistical verification of the presence of a long-run downward trend has proven elusive. Cotton price volatility has 
varied widely over the last 226 years, largely correlated with macroeconomic instability. Cotton’s period of greatest 
instability—during the U.S. Civil War—was primarily driven by cotton-specific trade and production disruptions, 
but since the Civil War, cotton volatility has largely coincided with broader commodity price volatility. One of 
cotton’s most volatility\e episodes since 18th century occurred over 2009-12, and was in part a consequence of 
nearly unprecedented macroeconomic instability and, in part due to factors specific to cotton markets. Looking 
ahead, cotton price volatility over 2018-27 is likely to be greater than the volatility experienced during 2016-17, 
when volatility was unusually low, likely reduced by China’s large sales from its National Reserve. 
 
(The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be construed 
to represent the opinions or policy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.)  
 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, issues concerning forecasting the long run direction of cotton prices is largely addressed through 
literature review. The statistical problems involved in the analysis are complex enough that our individual findings 
can be regarded as tentative. Trends evident each year in USDA’s published long run real cotton price forecasts are 
clearly downward trending, but the shifts from one publication year to the next in the mean along which these trends 
are realized is used as evidence of the importance of understanding the sources and impacts of volatility.  
 
Volatility of individual U.S. commodity prices over time is measured as early as the 1790s, and periods of general 
price volatility are identified through cross-sectional aggregation of volatility measures across sets of commodity 
prices. Cotton price volatility over 1960-2017 is estimated with a GARCH model, and other measures. The frequent 
association of periods of high volatility in cotton prices with periods of general price volatility, and the association 
in turn of these generally volatile periods with macroeconomic uncertainty and regime shifts are used to draw 
implications about the roots of the 2010-11 cotton price spike and about the future of cotton price volatility. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Volatility Measures 
In this paper, individual commodity (n) price series volatility at various times (t) is measured 3 ways, and general 
commodity price volatility is measured using 2 cross-sectional summarizations of individual price volatility. The 
individual volatility measures employed here are 1) the conditional variance (hn t) from a general autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model of the price series, 2) the sample standard deviation (ߜመn t) for rolling, 
centered sub-samples of the log first-differences of the price, and 3) the magnitude of the year-to-year logged-price 
change if that change is in the 90th percentile of the sample’s absolute year-to-year changes (λn t). General 
commodity volatility is measured as 1) the median at each time (Ψ1t) of a database’s N price series’ sub-sample 
standard deviations (ߜመn t), and 2) the proportion at each time (Ψ2t) of the N individual commodity prices in a database 
that have absolute year-to-year changes in the 90th percentile (i.e., when λn t ≠ 0). 
 
All three individual volatility measures are related to the theoretical properties of a commodity price series. If price 
is represented by yt, and yt is stationary, with an autoregressive data generating process (DGP) of order pm, then: 
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While the unconditional mean of yt in this model is constant at 
ఋ
ଵି∑ ఘ೔೛೔సభ
, the conditional mean—conditional on the 
information set (Ωt-1) of past realizations of yt— (E(yt| Ωt-1) varies over time. The variance of yt is also fixed, both the 
unconditional variance, and the conditional variance, the latter of which equals σt2. Engle (1982) and Bollerslev 
(1986) extended this model to account for the apparent clustering of periods of higher and lower volatility in many 
financial time series. In this general autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model, the 
unconditional variance again remains constant, but the conditional variance is now a function of the information set 
(Ωt-1). In the GARCH model,  
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In the GARCH (pv, q) model, the conditional variance is, 
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This approach has the benefit of consistently filtering out the impact of the changing conditional mean to produce 
sound estimates of the volatility. It has the cost of computational complexity and demanding data requirements. The 
impact of possible errors in specifying and estimating the model must be balanced against the benefits. As an 
alternative, an approximation of the conditional standard error can be estimated from yt. A t-centered, rolling-
sample, standard deviation (ߜመn, t) of the log differences for sub-sets of the T time periods in the dataset is useful 
when GARCH modeling is not appropriate. 
 
The most indirect measure of volatility (λn t) is based on the range of a price over a 12-month period, measured as 
the difference between the price at the end of the period from the beginning, focusing only on the extreme values of 
these differences in set of T dates (changes whose absolute value is in the 90th percentile of the sample). In our 
monthly U.S. cotton price data the threshold for the 90th percentile was 45.3 percent. This approach is only useful for 
detecting and measuring episodes of high volatility, and is motivated by the theory of the competitive storage model 
(Gustofsen, 1958; Cafiero, et al., 2011). With storage, variations in stockholding help smooth consumption across 
periods with supply and demand shocks, while deviation of prices from long-run expected levels and the marginal 
cost of production alter the incentives to hold and release stocks, as well as consumption and production. In this 
model, large deviations from smoothly evolving price trends are inevitably self-correcting (Chen, et al., 2014; Wang 
and Tomek, 2007), and the large absolute changes (λn t) will correlate with underlying volatility. 
 
Data 
Annual and monthly databases of U.S. commodity prices were assembled, starting from 1791, covering essentially 
the entire period in which prices quoted in U.S. dollars are available. A monthly database of U.S. cotton prices 
covering 1791:12 to 2017:12 was assembled, centered on the USDA/AMS 7-market U.S. average spot quotations 
for base quality (color 41, leaf 4, staple 34). Consistent with changing commercial practice and market standards 
prevailing in different time periods, the grade of quoted prices and the transaction location of the quotes varies in the 
earlier years of the dataset. Grading standards, driven by the average characteristics of the fiber produced in the 
United States and demanded by textile mills around the world, have changed substantially over the last 225 years 
(Quark, 2013), and the first 115 years of our dataset is for New York spot prices of 7/8-inch staple cotton. 
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Overlapping data from various sources (USDA/AMS, 2017; USDA/ERS, 1974; USDA/BAE, 1951; Cole, 1938) are 
used to derive adjustment factors and maintain a price series that consistently reflects prevailing commercial 
standards over time, and smoothly transitions between the characteristics of newer and older series of data. 
 
Annual data were also assembled for 12 commodities over 1792-2016: cotton, coffee, copper, sugar, corn, rice, 
wheat, coal, wool (1850- ), petroleum (1859- ), rubber (1869- ), rayon (1921- ), and polyester (1952- ). To the 
greatest extent possible, these prices are for transactions within the United States, with the entire 18th and 19th 
centuries’ data representing U.S.-specific quotes. Since the mid-20th century, as the relative global role of U.S. 
commodity production and consumption has declined, market activity has sometimes shifted to non-U.S. locations. 
As described for the monthly cotton prices above, consistent price series have been developed for each commodity, 
albeit at a lower frequency than for cotton alone (details available from authors upon request). This dataset was used 
to detect periods of general commodity volatility over 1792-2016 by calculating 1) the median (Ψ1t) at each time t of 
the dataset’s N standard deviations (σn,t) of the dataset’s prices’ logged annual price changes over rolling, centered, 
5-year intervals, and 2) the proportion of prices with 90th percentile changes each year (Ψ2t). 
 
The World Bank’s public monthly commodity price database (World Bank, 2017) for 38 commodities was used to 
calculate a monthly version of Ψ2t for 1961-2016. In this case, the monthly absolute logged-price changes (λt) used 
to calculate Ψ2t were calculated with respect to 12 months earlier. This allows a finer level of temporal detail than 
possible with the database of calendar year averages used above, and has a larger number of commodities. The 
variety of datasets and volatility measures used permits corroboration of observed patterns. 
 
All prices were adjusted for inflation with the U.S. CPI (BLS, 2017), which the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes 
back to January 1913. Annual data back for 1912-1791 are from a data set compiled by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), 
raised to a monthly frequency using EViews quadratic-match-average option for the 226-year, monthly cotton price 
series. 
 
Results 
 
Results of λt Calculation 
Figures 1 and 2 visually summarize the apparent trends and the occurrences of months of extreme change (λt) in U.S. 
cotton prices over 226 years, 1791-2017. The apparent downward trend observed in Figure 2 will be addressed in 
the Discussion portion of this paper, after reviewing the volatility results.  
 
In the monthly cotton price data, months with either extreme increases or decreases (λt) are largely found to be 
grouped in episodes of sequential realizations, and we define three types of these episodes. One type has extreme 
changes in a given direction that is sometimes followed within about 12 months by another episode with changes in 
the same direction, but more frequently by an episode with opposite-signed changes. We group these sets of adjacent 
episodes together and term the group a cycle (Table 1). Thus, one type of episode is at the start of a cycle, which 
occurs after a relatively long period following the end of the last preceding cycle, the median gap being 44 months 
over the 226-year sample. Another type of episode follows these cycle-initiating episodes with a median gap of 10 
months, a span of time consistent with the annual production cycle of cotton and other temperate-zone row crops. 
The cycle-initiating episodes can be broken into two types: those significant enough to trigger subsequent offsetting 
episodes and those that are not. Table 1 lists all the cycles observed over 1791-2017, and 6 cycles with extreme 
changes in only one direction are listed. While the median peak absolute value of the price changes in these 
truncated cycles is only moderately below the median of the initiating-episodes of the 12 bi-directional peacetime 
cycles listed (48 percent versus 54 percent), they do represent less significant economic disruptions. The longer, bi-
directional cycles often include periods with macroeconomic shocks in both directions, and/or repeated 
macroeconomic shocks. Peacetime cycles are shaded grey in Figures 1 and 2 while periods of military conflict are 
indicated with cross-hatched bars. 
 
The largest disruption to date was that associated with the U.S. Civil War, initiated by the prospects for, and 
subsequent realization of, cotton trade embargos and sharply reduced U.S. cotton production. While the peak price 
levels of this cycle have been truncated from Figure 1, August 1861 saw the initiation of 22 sequential months in 
which prices were more than 45.3 percent above those of 12 months earlier, the longest such episode in our sample. 
Prices during this episode were as much as λt = 115 percent higher than 12 months earlier in real terms, the largest 
positive difference observed. Conversely, April 1865 saw the initiation of an 11-month string of extreme declines—
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as much as λt = 133 percent down relative to 12 months earlier, the largest absolute change in this study’s sample—
clearly representing the operation of an offsetting change in expectations and activity compared with 1861. Given 
the scale of the disruption to U.S. agriculture, government debt, and money supply, we have grouped the extreme 
price changes that occurred as late as 1872 with the Civil War cycle in Table 1. 
 
Most peace-time cotton price cycles were much shorter and less severe, and a majority of these cycles clearly 
coincide with the dates of significant events in the U.S. and/or global macroeconomy. While 19th century business 
cycles were different in many important respects from business cycles as understood in the modern economy—
leading to questions about the appropriate measurement of their extent and duration (Davis and Weidenmier, 2016; 
Romer, 1986; Huffman and Lothian, 1984)—the historical record is clear that significant financial panics occurred 
in the U.S. and/or the UK in 1819, 1826, 1837, and 1848. Additionally, Jacks et al. (2011) GARCH modeling of 
monthly Philadelphia commodity prices over 1784-1896 results in ht estimates with similarly-sized peaks in most of 
the same years as our Ψ1t and Ψ2t estimates. 
 
Note that the Panic of 1819 in part reflected the prolonged impact of the 1815 eruption of Mount Tambora (Wood, 
2014), and also the 1818 payment on the debt incurred before the War of 1812 for the Louisiana Purchase 
(Rothbard, 1962). But the 1819 event is best understood as part of the transition between war-time and peace-time 
government finance in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere. The other years (1826, 1837, and 1848) are peace-
time economic downturns coinciding with downward cotton price extremes. Both the conflict-related and peace-
time episodes are evidence of the importance of macroeconomic stability to the level of commodity price volatility. 
 
The largest absolute peace-time price change—and the second largest change in either war or peace—was the 122-
percent decline realized in April 1922. Friedman and Schwartz (1965) have highlighted how this period represented 
one of the most extreme declines in money supply and wholesale prices observed in their study of the 1865-1965 
U.S. monetary system, and cite missteps by the relatively new Federal Reserve System in the genesis of this shock. 
Analogous to the case of the negative 1819 episode, we have included the early 1920s in Table 1 as part of the cycle 
started by the initiation of World War I, since again it followed from the efforts of combatants that had suspended 
the specie convertibility of their currencies, and/or borrowed extensively, to later drive domestic prices back down 
to pre-War levels. 
 
Two cycles bear particular note, those starting, respectively, in 1973 and 2009. The importance of these cycles stems 
from their being the largest most-recent cycles—the 2 largest cycles in a time period most similar to the foreseeable 
future—and from an aspect of the timing of the start of the 1973 cycle. This cycle started 376 months following the 
end of the previous cycle (compared with a 44-month median gap for all cycles). The absence of extreme price 
changes during any month in 1943-1972 is an achievement never approached even remotely during any comparable 
stretch of time, excepting the end of the 19th century. Between 1872 and 1900, 336 months occurred with no extreme 
cotton price changes, despite the occurrence of some major economic shocks, including panics in 1873 and 1893. 
Similarly, the panic 1907 was not associated with an extreme change in cotton prices. 
 
Results of Ψ2t Calculations 
Analysis of the monthly World Bank (WB) commodity price data provides monthly values for the general volatility 
measure Ψ2t for 1961-2017. Trends in the monthly Ψ2t—and differentiating between the negative and positive 
components of the calculated share—illustrates the association of extreme cotton price changes with macroeconomic 
disruption. Figure 3 shows the full 1961-2017 series of monthly cotton price changes from 12 months earlier, and 
the monthly level of Ψ2t—the share of the database realizing extreme changes—broken out into positive and 
negative extreme changes. As in Figure 2, the pre-1971 lack of price volatility is apparent Figure 3’s general 
volatility measure (Ψ2t) data, although the cotton price data in Figure 3 clearly shows an impact from the 1966 U.S. 
farm legislation’s cuts in price support. The effect of the 1985 U.S. farm legislation shows up as a pair of brief price 
changes in 1986 and 1987. 
 
The pair of maximum values for the cotton price changes and Ψ2t largely coincide with 1973 and the period around 
2010. In 1973-75, the alignment of the cotton and general commodity price volatility is nearly perfect, and while the 
2010 cotton price shock is not so clearly parallel with general price trends, the broader 2009-12 cycle shows greater 
alignment with Ψ2t than general press narratives of the 2010 price spike typically acknowledge (e.g. Financial 
Times, 2010). 
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The years 1973 and 2009 are the only 2 times Ψ2t ≥ 50 percent. In 2009, virtually all the price extremes driving Ψ2t 
to the 1961-2017 sample maximum (March 2009) were negative, as was the cotton price change that same month. 
While the sharp, upward cotton price spike in 2010-11 (maximum λt = 94 percent, Feb. 2011) was not matched by a 
general realization of extreme price changes, in Figure 3 one can see that both 2010 and 2011 realized values for Ψ2t 
well above the sample median of 8 percent, suggesting a more drawn out, but still notable period of broader 
volatility. 
 
Annually-based Ψ2t calculations (Figure 4), show the same 1960-2017 patterns in general commodity price volatility 
as the monthly data. Additionally, the annual data extend back to the end of the 18th century. Aggregating price data 
from a monthly frequency into January-December averages alters some of the observed year-to-year relationships, 
and the commodity compositions of the two databases are also different, so slightly different conclusions can be 
drawn depending on which data are examined. 
 
One example is that with the annually-based data the 2011 value of Ψ2t becomes among the highest of the 226-year 
sample, while in the monthly data 2011 is far less remarkable: another is that the 2009 peak apparent in the monthly 
calculations is less remarkable in the annual data. The relative positions of the upward and downward values for λt 
also differ with the choice of annual or monthly data: the absolute value of the 2012 decline exceeds the absolute 
value of either of the preceding years of positive values. Although different in certain respects, the results of both 
annual and monthly data analysis both support the conclusion that 2009-11 was a period both general commodity 
price and cotton price volatility. For example, the 2011 cotton price increase coincides with Ψ2t = 55 percent, only 
the fourth time we observe Ψ2t > 50 percent in the post-1900 annually-based data. The annually-measured 2011 
price increases reflect low prices in 2010, which in turn were a consequence of the declines that were realized during 
the months of 2009.  
 
The annual Ψ2t calculations in Figure 4 also highlight that 1921, in addition to standing out in the Friedman and 
Schwartz (1965) study of U.S. monetary history, also stands out with its realization of the highest share of extreme 
commodity price changes in the entire 226-year annual sample (Ψ2t = 82%). Similarly, the annually-based λt 
calculation for cotton matches the monthly-based results in marking 1921 as the year of the most extreme 12-month 
cotton price change realized outside of the U.S. Civil War. The annual Ψ2t data also highlight the 1930s as a period 
of general price volatility comparable to the 1930s. The onset of the Great Depression on the subsequent global 
exchange rate devaluations and collapse of the gold standard was a period of significant macroeconomic uncertainty 
and volatility. 
 
The annual Ψ2t data also illustrate that the relatively low volatility of cotton prices during 1873-1913 and 1942-72 
corresponds strongly with periods of remarkably low general commodity price volatility. The global monetary 
systems prevailing in each of these two periods revolved around a major large economy, with fixed exchange rates. 
Note that the UK lost its position as the world’s largest economy to the United States during the period of 19th 
century stability, but the system continued to function much as it had earlier until the first World War. The annually-
based λt cotton calculations show one gold standard period extreme value—in 1900—and the monthly-based λt 
calculations show several, minor extreme cotton price changes during 1900-11. This volatility may reflect the 
impact of the UK’s declining ability to act as a moderating locus of world monetary affairs towards the end of the 
gold standard period (Eichengreen, 2004). This later period also included some historically notorious efforts to 
manipulate U.S. cotton futures prices (Baker and Hahn, 2016), but the history of 19th century U.S. commodity 
markets is rife with episodes of real or purported manipulation, and the important question is why cotton prices 
avoided extreme changes early in the gold standard era, but not later. 
 
Results of ࢾ෡n,t and Ψ1t Calculations 
Since λt and Ψ2t are unconventional volatility measures, we also calculate standard deviations of log-difference real 
annual prices (ߜመnt) over 1792-2016, using 5-year-centered rolling samples, and then calculate the median of the N ߜመnt 
estimates for each year (Ψ1t, in Figure 5). The peaks of ߜመcotton, t coincide virtually exactly with the λt peaks throughout 
the 224-year sample, and starting in the 1870s, the path of ߜመcotton, t coincides almost exactly with Ψ1t. We can observe 
in Figure 5 that cotton realized a volatility peak in 1921 that was an outlier with respect to the general relationship 
observable between ߜመcotton, t and Ψ1t prevailing from the 1870s to the 21st century, and that 2012 was even more of an 
outlier in this respect. 
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A smaller outlier over 2001-05 can be observed representing a cycle of cotton price volatility driven by a mix of 
macroeconomic and cotton-specific events. The events during the cycle show similarities to those during 2009-12, 
so a brief discussion here of 2001-05 will help illuminate the later analysis of the 2009-12 cycle. In 2001, cotton 
production rose sharply around the world and China raised expectations of large sales from its reserves just as a 
global economic slowdown curtailed consumption growth, leading to a sharp decline in price. In 2003, the impact of 
rebounding prices due to tight supplies (a consequence of the negative production responses to the 2001 price 
decline) was compounded by severe late-season weather damage to China’s 2003/04 production, resulting in 
unprecedented U.S. export sales to China, and a second, temporary, surge in cotton prices.  
 
Returning briefly to the big picture, with Ψ1t—as with Ψ2t—we again observe the highest levels of general 
commodity price volatility during the 19th century during the War of 1812 and the Civil War. The Ψ1t data also 
confirm the relatively high general commodity price volatility during 2010-12, coincident with extraordinary 
volatility in cotton prices. 
 
As with λt for cotton, the ߜመcotton, t calculations show the greatest volatility for cotton during the U.S. Civil War, but 
the entire pre-1860 period also shows relatively high cotton price volatility with respect to general price volatility. 
This could be a function of the greater role international trade played in determining U.S. cotton prices compared 
with other commodity prices.  
 
Results of GARCH Model 
The GARCH modelling effort focused only on cotton prices, and only on 1960-2017, since this is the period with 
the most relevance to developing expectations of future price behavior. Testing of the real log monthly price series 
in levels indicated the presence of one unit root, so the estimation proceeded using first-differenced data. While the 
unit root test results in studies examining patterns in the mean of cotton prices (see Table 2) often turn on the role of 
breaks in the cotton price data series as a source of spurious unit root results, we abstract from these issues and 
model the volatility with the data starting with first-differences. 
 
Following Enders (2010), the data generating process (DGP) of the cotton price series’ first-difference mean was 
identified using the traditional Box-Jenkins analysis of the patterns in the estimated auto- and partial auto-
correlations. Deterministic variables were introduced to account for the impact of U.S. Farm Legislation in 1966 and 
1986, and for the downward shocks associated with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis and the upward shocks 
associated with the subsequent extraordinary responses by monetary authorities and fiscal activity in the United 
States, China, Europe, and elsewhere. 
 
The errors of ARMA (0, 3) model showed no evidence of autocorrelation, but did show evidence of auto-regressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH). A GARCH (1, 1) process was added, eliminating the ARCH characteristics 
of the error term, and was superior to other specifications of the error process, based on conventional information 
criteria. 
 
The estimated conditional variances (ht) (Figure 7) show remarkably low volatility was realized during 2016-17. 
Median volatility was 40-50 percent below median values of the previous 10 and 20 years. The estimates also show 
volatility peaking in January 1974 and August 2011. The 1961-2017 sample’s overall peak is in 2011, and occurs 
during the start of the rapid descent in cotton prices after the 2010-11 spike. This highlights again that although the 
2009-12 extreme changes in cotton prices in large part reflected macroeconomic instability at that time, factors 
peculiar to the cotton market played a more important role in the cotton price volatility than was the case in the 
1970s.  
 
The absence of a common, relatively extraordinary shock across commodities (Ψ1t and Ψ2t) at that time completely 
comparable to cotton’s volatility as measured first by ߜመcotton,t and λt—and now more formally by ht—suggests an 
important role for cotton-market-specific events during the upward portion of the 2009-12 cycle. 
 
Discussion 
 
The 2009-12 cotton price cycle was driven by general economic factors and cotton-specific factors. Most analysis of 
the period of peak cotton price levels in 2010-11 focus on a sub-set of the cotton-specific factors. Often overlooked 
in these accounts is the role of macroeconomic events in the cycle’s initiation.  
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One aspect of cotton’s unusual response to the Global Financial Crisis is the greater responsiveness of cotton 
consumption to income—particularly downward shocks—than the consumption of other agricultural commodities 
(MacDonald and Vollrath, 2005). Figure 6 shows estimated annual growth in world gross domestic product (GDP) 
from a combination of the Angus Maddison database and the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic 
Outlook database, together spanning the years 1831-2019. This illustrates that the downward global income shock 
associated with the onset of the 2009 financial crisis stands out as one of the biggest such shocks since the 19th 
century. Outside of the Great Depression, 2009 was only the second peace-time occurrence of negative global GDP 
growth. The last previous such occurrence was in 1908, following the Panic of 1907, which, while it did not result in 
an extreme cotton price shock, was severe enough to help trigger the later establishment of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
System. 
 
Macroeconomic volatility led to a broad decline in commodity prices after the Northern Hemisphere harvest in 
2008/09, and low cotton prices persisted through the 2009 crop’s planting season. In March 2009, cotton prices 
reached a 4-year low, and the IMF’s 2010 world GDP forecast fell below 2.0 percent, a growth rate consistent with a 
decline in world cotton consumption. By October 2010, the IMF was estimating 2010 world GDP growth at an 
above-average 4.8 percent, and USDA’s marketing year 2009/10 (August-July) world consumption forecast was 
raised 4 million bales between January and December 2010. Since spring 2009 plantings were depressed, 2009/10 
production was 5 million bales lower than the year before and 17 million bales lower than two years earlier. With 
prices rising in the spring of 2010, Northern Hemisphere cotton area outside of China and Pakistan rose 12.5 percent 
from a year earlier in the 2010/11 marketing year, and good weather resulted in an unexpected boost to U.S. 
production. But the combination of low carry-in stocks, surging demand, falling area in China, and flood damage in 
Pakistan brought a tightening of world cotton supplies. 
 
Two developments specific to cotton during the period when cotton prices began to approach nominal levels last 
seen during the U.S. Civil War included the tightening of export controls by India and the apparent depletion of 
saleable cotton from China’s National Reserve. In April 2010, India (the world’s second largest exporter after the 
United States) first announced export restraints on cotton, and early in October 2010 India introduced licensing 
requirements that would have prohibited shipment of many of their export sales. China had been using purchases 
and sales by its National Reserve to limit price volatility from the start of the Global Financial Crisis. World cotton 
price declines in 2008/09 were arguably limited through the Reserves purchases of 13 million bales, and then 
starting in May 2009 the reserve sold 16.6 million bales (equivalent to 14 percent of world consumption) to smooth 
rebounding prices. But the reserve halted sales in November 2010, a tangible signal that the Reserve’s undisclosed 
level has reached a low threshold, and cutting off an important source of cotton for China’s textile industry. 
 
Under these unusual circumstances, cotton markets behaved in an unusual manner. U.S. cotton futures in November 
2010 experienced one of the 4 most outstanding periods of explosive bi-directional price changes realized in any 
futures market for commodities over 1970-2013 (Etienne, et al. 2014). USDA’s U.S. Export Sales reporting system 
also showed remarkably high early season sales during that time, consistent with precautionary buying in excess of 
ordinary seasonal demands. These two developments indicate a possible role for herding behavior and feedback 
trading by market participants at some points during the price spike. 
 
Mass media accounts of the price spike often cited production shortfalls in their analysis, but our analysis indicates 
that assuming a large negative weather shock was the source of the price shock would be inappropriate. The global 
supply impact of shocks to cotton production was mixed in 2010/11, with unusually and unexpectedly good weather 
in the United States (third largest global producer) and destructive floods in Pakistan (fourth largest). Floods in 
Australia cut production, but output significantly exceeded early-season expectations and previous-years’ production 
as the country finally emerged from a prolonged El Niño impact. China's crop (then the world’s largest) significantly 
under-shot initial expectations, and the corrections to the forecasts came only in the fall, unusually late. But these 
corrections primarily reflected unexpected declines in area rather than yield.  
 
The unexpected nature of the decline in area may have reflected a shock to the information flows coming out of 
China in 2010. China’s government severed international telephone and all internet access to Xinjiang for nearly a 
year (in the case of internet) starting in July 2009, and imposed other security responses that continued afterwards, 
due to a significant outbreak of ethnic violence there (Hogg, 2010). Given that Xinjiang’s contact with the outside 
world was hindered through its planting season, the traditional channels for conveying planted-area information 
from this strategic region might not have been capable of ex post discovery of planted area for many months. 
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Regardless of the source of the unusual forecast error, the remarkably high upward errors in virtually all forecasts of 
China’s production until October 2010, was a contributing factor to the sharp rises in cotton prices observed in 
October and November 2010. 
 
Making the leap from simply noting the association between various events and the price spike to the next stage of 
assigning a chain of causality for these events is challenging. On one level, the macroeconomic volatility in 2009-10 
can be described as an ultimate cause of first the decline in production and then the increase in demand that set the 
stage for a secondary set of events. For example, India’s trade restrictions, and the rapid expansion of precautionary 
demand seen in futures markets are akin to events in world soybean markets in 1973 when the U.S. banned soybean 
exports (USDA/ERS, 1986), and the dynamic of largely self-defeating individual trade policy adjustments in 
response to global agricultural price increases had already played out in the response to higher grain prices in the 
years before 2009 (Gouel, 2013). Thus, for cotton in 2010, these could be regarded as typical endogenous responses 
set in motion by the initial macroeconomic shock. The question of China’s large interventions, sudden cut-off of 
Reserve sales, and transparency issues regarding the actual size of its reserves and developments in its largest 
cotton-producing province—Xinjiang—also in many respects predated the period of volatility, but take on added 
meaning given China’s outsized role in world cotton markets at that time (MacDonald, et al., 2015). The similarities 
between China’s role in the smaller 2001-03 cycle and the 2009-12 cycle suggest a dynamic in China’s market that 
made cotton prices more vulnerable to the after-effects of earlier macroeconomic shocks. Ultimately, in both cases, 
only the macro shock seems to warrant a completely independent important causal role. The degree of inevitability 
or independence of causality for subsequent events associated with the price’s continued drive to nominal levels 
unseen since the U.S. Civil War is debatable, and awaits future research.  
 
Forecasting Long Run Price Trends 
The impact of the 2010-11 price shock continued through 2017/18 in the form of below-peak global cotton 
consumption, but more interesting from a forecasting perspective was the impact on expectations of future cotton 
prices in the years immediately after the shock. Figure 8 shows USDA’s long-run (10-year) baseline projections for 
cotton prices published each year for 2007-2017. One can observe that the expectations for average future prices in 
any given year are highly correlated with the prices prevailing around the year the forecast is published. While each 
of the 11 sets of USDA 10-year projections includes periods of declining real prices, the mean of these projections 
varies substantially, and is highly correlated (75 percent) with the price expected in the year the forecast was 
created. 
 
Both of these characteristics of long-run price projections (downward trends vulnerability to shocks) are analogous 
to aspects of the findings typical in the literature on commodity and cotton price behavior. Reviewing this literature 
in the light of the impact of the 2010 price spike reveals the importance of understanding the genesis and role of 
price volatility in the evolution of commodity prices. That ephemeral shocks are difficult to distinguish from shifts 
in the mean is one such characteristic. This failure to distinguish ephemeral from persistent changes results in 
forecast error, and presumably sub-optimal policy outcomes, like the wide divergences between both U.S. loan rates 
after 1981 and China’s domestic cotton price supports after 2011 relative to the lower market prices that were 
realized in the years following the implementation of those two policy regimes. 
 
Casual examination of Figure 2 of real U.S. cotton prices over 1900-2017 suggests that there has been a long run 
decline. A similar pattern has been observed in many commodity prices, and Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) 
presented early post-war analysis hypothesizing there was a generalized commodity price trend (using an 1870-1945 
sample). A large literature emerged in subsequent years testing the Prebisch-Singer Hypothesis (PSH), reaching 
varying conclusions as additional years of data were analyzed and statistical techniques evolved. Analysis of 
commodity price indexes has given way to analyzing individual prices either with panel techniques (Azerki et al, 
2014) or as a set of individual series (e.g. Kellard and Wohar, 2006). Baffes and Etienne (2015) provide a concise 
recent summary of studies testing the PSH, and Table 3 summarizes the most recent studies that included tests for 
the presence of a downward trend in cotton prices, and two generalizations arise from reviewing these studies: 1) 
making statistically verifiable statements about the presence or absence of trends in cotton prices is difficult, and 2) 
that studies that account for breaks or mean shifts in cotton prices typically find break points coinciding with the 
dates of extreme cotton price changes identified through our first volatility measure, the monthly-based λt. 
 
On the one hand, a variety of economic studies offer measurements indicating the presence of—and/or sound 
reasons to expect—a relative productivity-growth differential favoring agriculture versus the general economy over 
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large portions of the years since the start of the 20th century (e.g. Olmsted and Rhode, 2008 ;Gordon, 2012; 
O’Donoghue et al., 2011; Fuglie, 2012). But, on the other hand, it is quite possible that a pattern of real price 
declines over the long run could be realized at least in part through stepwise shifts, as with the findings of Enders 
and Holt (2012), for example. It is also possible that some portion of any downward movement in real commodity 
prices is an artifact of sustained over-estimation of the rate of inflation due to the failure to fully capture the impact 
of improving product characteristics (Nordhaus, 1998). Grilli and Yang (1988) raise this latter issue, but also note 
that the characteristics of primary commodities have arguably improved as well, exemplified here by the observation 
that the standard grade of cotton traded on world markets has increased in staple length from 7/8” at the start of the 
20th century to 1 3/16” today. The importance of correctly measuring inflation is indicated by Svedberg and Tilton 
(2006) who argue that real copper prices have actually risen in the long run when corrected for inflation-bias, and 
Wang and Tomek (2007) who highlight that inappropriate transformations of price data utilizing poorly-measured 
inflation could introduce spurious findings. 
 
Baffes and Etienne (2015) abstract from the need to confirm a specific statistical property of a commodity price 
series by integrating the often-overlooked causal half of the PSH with the trend question in a model that tests the 
long run relationship between cotton prices and income. They find a significant negative relationship, and since 
world income has a positive trend, their finding is consistent with a declining cotton trend. In addition, in their 
model, the channel through which income growth causes a real decline in commodity prices is by increasing the 
index of non-commodity prices, again highlighting the central role of inflation measures in the issue of real 
commodity price trends. 
 
The variety of conclusions in the literature argues for caution in the interpretation of any study of long-run price 
levels. But the consistency over long periods between inflation data relative to exchange rates across a number of 
developed countries suggests the methodology of price index estimation, however flawed, is well developed and 
unlikely to change radically in the next 10 years. Therefore, even if an observed trend is ultimately based on biased 
data, the bias is likely to continue. 
 
Conclusions 
 
1) It is appropriate for USDA to project declining real agricultural prices over significant portions of its 10-
year forecast horizon. 
2) Distinguishing even temporary mean shifts from large, ephemeral shocks is difficult but important. 
3) The low volatility realized by cotton prices during 2016-17 is probably not a good basis for expectations of 
volatility over 2018-27. 
 
On one level, the assertion that commodity price stability is contingent of macroeconomic stability is too obvious to 
be useful. Few would be surprised that a large negative shock to global income had serious implications for price 
stability. But the kind of macroeconomic stability that has in the past resulted in commodity price stability is of a 
higher order than annual GDP stability. Figure 6 with 1831-2019 world GDP growth indicates that the periods of 
remarkably low commodity price volatility (under the Gold Standard and Bretton Woods System—see Table 3) 
were dissimilar with respect to patterns of income growth. They differed both in volatility and in the mean level of 
growth prevailing. The Bretton Woods period was characterized by the highest average level of GDP growth 
observed in the nearly 200-year sample for income growth. The 19th century gold standard period included several 
years with sharp, downward economic shocks, but these shocks did not translate into commodity price volatility. 
The monetary institutions prevailing during both of these periods assured monetary stability, which translated into 
commodity price stability despite other economic shocks (see Eichengreen, 2008 and Block, 1977 for an overview 
of monetary governance channels). 
 
Regarding the prospects for a differential between 2016-17 and 2018-27 volatility: China made large amounts of 
cotton available from its National Reserve over 2016-17 in a consistent, flexible, and relatively transparent manner. 
A subsequent decline in the Reserve to its desired long-run level would mean the sales would stop, conceivably in 
an unexpected manner due to uncertainty about the size of the Reserve. After net sales stop, global cotton markets 
will have to contend with both the loss of a stable source of cotton, and the likely return of large and varying import 
demand from China. 
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Thinking more generally about the long-run outlook, recall that the lowest volatility for cotton prices has occurred in 
periods when global monetary arrangements were stable and well anchored in the financial markets of the largest 
economy. The world’s current two largest economies—the United States and China—have a very different 
relationship than that prevailing between the United States and the UK during the latter part of the highly-stable 
Gold Standard period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This would suggest that the typical level of volatility 
over the next decade would more closely resemble the 1970-2015 median than the 1942-70 or 1870-1913 medians. 
While we have no basis to predict a disruption as profound as those in 1973 or 2009 in the foreseeable future, we 
also have little justification in completely ruling out a comparable shock. The historical distribution of commodity 
and cotton price changes has included some very extreme values, and additional research in several disciplines will 
be necessary if forecasts of such changes in the future are to improve. 
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Table 1. Cycles of extreme cotton price changes in  
monthly data, 1792-2017. 
 
†subset of shorter cycles have only one extreme 
*positive shock preceded negative shock(s) in cycle 
 
 
Table 2. Recent studies of long run cotton price trends: summary of results 
  Price Series Characteristics Found 
Authors Sample Break dates & type 
Deterministic 
trend 
Random 
drift Other 
Leon and Soto (1997) 1900-1997 1967, trend 1985, intercept Negative Mixed 
Unit root with 
intercept shift 
Kim, et al (2003) 1900-1998 n/a None Yes -- 
Ocampo and Parra (2010) 1900-2000 None None Yes -- 
Kellard and Wohar (2006) 1900-1998 1929. both 1949, both None Yes 
Negative trends 
common for ag 
Balagatas and Holt (2009)* 1900-1998 
~1957-67 
~1980-85 
(intercept) 
None No 
Corn, rice, and 
wheat have 
negative trends 
Enders and Holt (2012) 1960-2010 (monthly) 
9 mean shifts 
(3 since 1985) 
Long run not 
discussed Mixed -- 
Azerzki, et al. (2014) 1872-2005 1945, both Negative No -- 
Azerzki, et al. (2014) 1900-2005 1930, both 1946, both 
Negative, 
since 1946 No -- 
 
  
 Cycle’s largest absolute change (λt) 
Duration† Negative  Positive 
 1808-19* -78  100 
1824-26* -103  57 
1833*   48  
1837-40* -61  50 
1845*  -55  
1848-52* -57  60 
1861-72* -133  115 
1900*   49  
1904-05* -70  47 
1909-11* -48   48 
1914-23* -122  75 
1926-27* -52  51 
1930-34* -54  51 
1937*  -46  
1941-42*   53  
1973-77* -88  100 
1981*  -54  
1986-87* -79  100 
1992*  -45  
2001-05* -78  54 
2009-12* -88  94 
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Table 3. Major events and periods affecting U.S. cotton and commodity price volatility 
Disruptive Stabilizing 
1803-15 Napoleonic Wars 
 
  
1818-21 Return to metallic currency 
standards in U.S. and 
Britain 
1815-1913 
 
 
“Pax Britannica”; U.K.-centric 
global economic integration 
1861-65 U.S. Civil War 
 
  
1866-73 Return to de facto U.S. 
gold standard 
  
  1870-1913 Global gold standard 
1914-18 First World War 
 
  
1920-25 Return to gold standard   
1930-40 Great Depression   
1939-45 Second World War   
 
 
1941-66 U.S. farm price support policy; 
strategic commodity stockpiling; 
petroleum price management 
 
 
 
 
1947-71 Bretton Woods System; fixed 
exchange rates; U.S.-centric 
global financial system 
1971-75 U.S. exchange rate unfixed   
2008-10 Global Financial Crisis 
shock and rebound 
  
 
